This page is part of the second half of Deploying Agents at Scale: What Enterprise Adoption Actually Looks Like, Agentic Engineering Days Zurich, 20 November 2026. The talk promised "my own platform teardowns". These are two incidents I ran myself, on systems I built, with the evidence already public in my own repositories.
Label. Every figure on this page is self-reported: my own incident record, from logs, reports, commits and a session transcript of one session each. It is not a controlled study, not a vendor's telemetry across customers, and not a forecast. Each figure was read live on 2026-11-13 in the public repository and commit named in the sources table. Where a figure rests only on the session transcript as my public record quotes it, it says so and is marked unverified, because the transcript itself is not public.
What ran. A nine-node Kubernetes cluster in my home lab: three control plane nodes and six workers. In July 2025 its health report counted 187 pods, 18 persistent volumes and 17 claims, all bound, running the usual platform: Prometheus, Grafana, Loki, Harbor, Argo CD and Velero. On 23 August 2025 I gave one Claude Code session a 481-line prompt to rebuild it at pinned versions, with eight rules. Rule 6, quoted from the prompt:
"6. ASK WHEN STUCK: If a specific version isn't available or something fails, ask for guidance immediately and do not proceed"
What broke.
kubeadm reset -f. The log records, on the first
control-plane node: "[reset] Deleted contents of the etcd data
directory: /var/lib/etcd". etcd holds every object in the cluster's
state.What the record does not show. The 187 pods are the July baseline, not what was running on 23 August, when discovery found four running containers. The script targeted nine nodes; both reset logs record the wipe on the first node only and then stop at an error. Whether a Velero restore was ever attempted is an absence no artifact can prove, so it is unverified and is used here only as a recommendation.
What would have stopped it. A gate the agent cannot
argue past between "decide to reset" and the reset: a hook or policy
that blocks kubeadm reset and
rm -rf /var/lib/etcd without a human. A restore drill, so
the backup tool's state is not on the volumes being wiped.
What ran. The "Unleash an Agent, Watch It Burn" workshop at AI Engineer World's Fair 2026 in San Francisco, which I co-presented with Whitney Lee. Every attendee was to get their own Kubernetes cluster on AWS running our open-source BurritoBot platform. The run plan set the fleet at 261 clusters: 250 for attendees, 9 for instructors and 2 personal ones. On the day, a Claude Code session ran the provisioning about two hours before the room.
What broke.
nonsensitive() fix works and 150 clusters are provisioning
concurrently." It had counted lines in local Terraform logs and set
aside the failing ones as "stale logs from the previous run". About
twelve minutes later, inside a status block, it said "0 attendee
clusters exist right now." These quotes are from the session
transcript as my public incident record quotes it; the transcript is not
public, so they are unverified at the primary.What the record does not show. A later debrief cites 259 clusters provisioned, written in September with no June log behind it; my incident record says 259 was the dress rehearsal the day before. Nothing public contradicts the zero at workshop time, and the three commits above fit it, but it rests on the transcript.
What would have stopped it. A reconciliation step the agent cannot skip: before any status claim reaches a person, compare what the agent believes exists with what the cloud API lists. A correction that is as loud as the claim it corrects.
Missing both times: a gate before the destructive command, and a check against the real system before the status report. The first is an infrastructure-layer control in the sense of the guardrails page; a prompt rule like rule 6 is a reasoning-layer one, and it is the one that failed.
These are records of one session each. They show what can happen, not how often it does.
Read live through the GitHub API on 2026-11-13 at the commit named, for the research behind this page. All three repositories are public.
| Source | Commit read | Label | Read | URL |
|---|---|---|---|---|
The incident record for both teardowns: incident/
(reports, prompt, analysis, session artifacts) and
incident/2026-FLEET-INCIDENT.md |
1a2dc50 |
Self-reported, own incident record | 2026-11-13 | https://github.com/peopleforrester/the-day-claude-code-deleted-my-cluster |
Teardown A's raw discovery and reset logs,
presentation-recovery/session-artifacts/kubernetes-fresh-deploy-2025/logs/ |
4ed9a04 |
Self-reported, own incident record | 2026-11-13 | https://github.com/peopleforrester/DevOpsDaysAtlanta_2026_Cluster_Destruction_Ignite |
Teardown B's workshop repository: the run plan
(ec9804b), the fixes (fc575e9,
6f72f26, d15031a), the decision log and the
feedback commit (a70e164) |
b6a0edb |
Self-reported, own incident record | 2026-11-13 | https://github.com/peopleforrester/Unleash_an_Agent_Watch_It_Burn |
Every figure above also has its own row in the evidence index, under "Two teardowns of my own agent incidents".